

be the true policy to reinforce to the utmost the army before Delhi. Accordingly, Brigadier-General Nicholson, with Her Majesty's 52nd, the remaining wing of the 61st, 2nd troop of European Horse Artillery, the 2nd Punjab Rifles, and some Mooltanee Horse, marched for Delhi. The moveable column in the Punjab from that time consisted of between 200 and 300 men of Her Majesty's 24th, 200 men of the 3rd and 6th Punjab Rifles, and two companies of military police, with some mounted levies. These remained in the Punjab, of course. The reinforcements above mentioned, which had marched for Delhi, were shortly followed by the remainder of Her Majesty's 8th and the 4th Punjab Rifles. One of the newly-raised Punjab regiments was also despatched to Meerut, to enable the military authorities there to spare a further detachment of the 60th Rifles and some European artillerymen, for service before Delhi. Lastly, there issued from the Ferozepore arsenal a first-class siege train, consisting of 18 heavy guns, of various calibres, with suitable stores of ammunition, the whole drawn by 16 elephants and 548 country waggons. The utmost credit is due to Captain Lewis, the Commissary of Ordnance, for his exertions in the preparation of this train. It was escorted by a wing of the Belooch battalion from Sindh, which had been sent up to render aid in the Punjab. At the same time the Jumnoo contingent, furnished by the Maha Rajah Rumbheer Sing, consisting of 2,000 infantry, 200 cavalry, and 6 guns, under the political charge of Lieutenant-Colonel R. Lawrence, was despatched to Delhi.

41. Such were the last reinforcements which the Punjab was able to send to Delhi. To send them, every nerve had been strained to the utmost; the last available soldier had gone: and it only remained to await the result with a humble trust in Providence. It is foreign to this narrative to recount what glorious successes were actually attained: how General Nicholson dealt the first deadly blow to the strength of the mutineers, by defeating their force at Nujjufgurh; and how nobly he led that final assault in which he perished. When Delhi fell, the knell of the great rebellion was sounded. It spread no farther anywhere; as the mutineers dispersed in flight, the country was restored to peace. Here and there, those rebels who had committed themselves beyond the hope of pardon, maintained a brief and ineffectual struggle. The chiefs who had joined in the revolt surrendered their strongholds, and gave themselves up. By the time that the insurgent Joudpore Legion arrived at Naround, on the frontier of the Delhi territory, they found that the country people were not on the side of the mutineers, and that there was a strong force ready to attack them.

42. By the time that Delhi fell, the tension upon the military resources of the Punjab had reached the utmost bearable pitch. After the departure of the final reinforcements for Delhi, there remained hardly more than 4,000 Europeans in the province of all arms; and the effectives must have been even less than this number. The spectacle of our weakness must have had its effect upon the native population, and the consequences manifested themselves in two émeutes, which occurred about this time.

43. In the hills near Murree, and in Lower Huzara, a conspiracy was discovered just in time to prevent its being carried out. The people of that country, who are all Mahomedans, were doubtless ripe for an outbreak. The success of the mutineers at Delhi, and the hopes thereby inspired of restoring Mahomedan power, had

offered irresistible temptation. Early in September, one of the petty chiefs of Huzara told the Chief Commissioner's informant, an English lady, that unless Delhi fell within a week, there would be a general insurrection in Huzara. Besides the general hope of revived power for the Mahomedans, there was the lust of plunder to incite the mountaineers to attempt the sack of Murree.

44. The next émeute was in Googaira district, south of Lahore, between the Ravee and the Sutlej. On the very evening of the memorable 14th of September (the assault of Delhi), a Mahomedan official of the postal department arrived at Lahore from Googaira, came before the Chief Commissioner, and reported, with a somewhat malicious twinkle of the eye, that all the wild and predatory tribes, inhabiting the jungly country between Lahore and Mooltan, had risen. In reply to a question, he further informed the Chief Commissioner that the numbers of the insurgents amounted to exactly 125,000 men. Such information was somewhat bewildering; nevertheless, within three hours one company of European Infantry (the most that could be spared), three guns, with European artillerymen, and 200 Sikh Cavalry, started from Lahore for the seat of the insurrection. The insurgents were, of course, contemptible as soldiers, but they were a hardy, brave, and athletic race, of pastoral habits. They had but few arms, and those few had been either seized from isolated police posts, or had been imported from the adjacent independent state of Bhawalpore. Their real strength lay in the character of the impervious jungles which they inhabited, and which may be described as vast waving sheets of high grass and low stunted trees. The insurrection was put down in about twenty days, with but small loss of life on our side. Some difficulty was, however, experienced in effecting this, and some 1,500 troops, of various kinds, had to be collected for the purpose. For some little time the direct line of communication with Bombay was interrupted, and a temporary postal line, down the right bank of the Sutlej, had to be opened.

45. Since that time peace and order have reigned in these territories. But it will be proper to consider very briefly what were the probable causes why the Punjab people and army resisted so long the general tendency to mutiny and rebellion; why, at the last, partial outbreaks began to occur; and why a general insurrection could no longer have been staved off if Delhi had not fallen.

46. In the first place, as previously remarked, the Punjabee troops had been well trained and disciplined. They had found incessant work to do; they had never been pampered or spoiled; they had never imbibed the notion that soldiers should not be generally useful in service. They had never learnt that anything except drill and manœuvring would be detrimental to their military efficiency. They were commanded by excellent officers, whom they regarded and respected. All the above considerations tended to bind them to our interests. On the other hand, the Punjabees despised and disliked the Hindoostanee soldiery. The Hindoostanees were boastful and vain-glorious in their bearing towards the Punjabee troops, and occasionally had been oppressive in their conduct towards the people. It was the European Infantry and Artillery, and not the Hindoostanees, that had broken the flower of the Sikh chivalry in two successive campaigns in 1846 and 1848, and the Punjabees longed to prove their superiority as soldiers against the Hindoostanees. Again, the Sikhs cherished an especial dislike against the Mahome-